Raj Sharma's Canadian Immigration Blog

Expedited processing for LMO (BC & Alberta)

New announcement on Service Canada's site.

The following 12 occupations have been identified for expedited LMO processing:

Carpenters;

Crane Operators;

Hotel and Hospitality Room Attendants;

Hotel Front Desk Clerks;

Food and Beverage Servers;

Food Counter Attendants;

Tour and Travel Guides;

Registered Nurses;

Dental Technicians

Pharmacists;

Snowboard and ski instructors; and

Retail Sales Persons and Sales Clerks.

Great news for the above occupations, but still not broad enought to cover general construction workers and other labourers that Alberta employers desperately require.

“Inconceivable, Incomprehensible, Indefensible, Incompetent”

A 'brash' file memo of then prosecutor and now BC Provincial Court Judge James Jardine condemned the actions of the fledgling Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) in erasing wiretap evidence concerning Talwinder Singh Parmar – suspected then and now of involvement, if not masterminding, the bombing of Air India’s Kanishka.

Notwithstanding numerous requests by the RCMP and Jardine with the prosecutor’s office, CSIS balked at providing evidence that may have assisted in the prosecution of those thought to be behind the greatest act of terrorism against Canada and Canadians. It is beyond comprehension that a law enforcement department would have to have asked more than once for such evidence.

Testimony before the Air India inquiry suggests that the erasure of the tapes were not done for any ‘ulterior’ purpose. James Warren, former head at CSIS of counter-terrorism apparently investigated the erasure and found that they were done following standard procedure for erasing tapes 10 days after the contents had been transcribed. So, it appears that CSIS wasn’t malicious in the destruction of the tapes -- just incompetent.

A couple of questions do come to mind however:

·         What was the justification of CSIS policy to destroy tapes? It certainly couldn’t have been a concern for conserving storage space or creating efficiencies (two goals the Federal Government has yet to be accused of);

·         Was any consideration made of the fact that the tapes were in relation to the worst single act of terrorism in Canada (and the world at that time)? If so, was this not sufficient to overcome mere policy? Also, why were ‘low level’ employees tasked with the destruction of the tapes?

·         Is this policy (to destroy tapes) concerning acts of terrorism still the standard procedure at CSIS?

Even if there was no nefarious reason for the destruction of the tapes (meaning, I suppose, some sort of sick or juvenile competition between the RCMP and CSIS for glory – or perhaps a simple dismissal or neglect of the matter as it concerned the deaths of hyphenated Canadians), the differences between CSIS and the RCMP is simply indefensible – both can be faulted for not putting aside their petty differences to concentrate on the prosecution of those involved in the deaths of 300 plus Canadians.

Important now are the following questions:

·         Have both departments learned from their respective failures on the Air India investigation and failed prosecution?

·         Can both departments work together on similar investigations in the future?

·         What assurances can they provide that inconceivable, incomprehensible, indefensible and incompetent actions will not occur when the next act of terrorism occurs against Canadians?

The families have been asking for this inquiry for years now. It is inconceivable that the Liberal Party of Canada, the governing party for much of that time,  opposed and certainly delayed calling for the inquiry.

The inquiry has actually resulted in evidence and understanding of the failures of law enforcement and counter-terrorism in Canada and will likely result in recommendations that will serve the public good. Unfortunately, much of the inquiry is a sad indictment of the state of Canada’s law enforcement and counter-terrorism departments - and also the role of the Liberal Government, which for reasons of its own -- wholly unrelated to investigating this heinous cowardly act -- delayed the inquiry and investigation into these failures.

The Importance of a Good Lawyer

It may be that Lai Changxing, accused by the Chinese government of massive fraud and is probably their most sought after expat, truly understands the importance of a good lawyer.

Changxing is represented by David Matas - a senior, distinguished, experienced and more than capable (some would say quixotic - but only in the best sense of the word) immigration/human rights lawyer who has managed to obtain another PRRA/review of risk against his client. Matas successfully impugned (from what appears to be) a massive, thorough PRRA decision (apparently close to 90 pages) that had rejected allegations of risk to the Federal Court. Matas was successful in arguing that the PRRA officer did not properly assess the risk of torture against his client.

CIC was to have appealed the judicial review, but has now relented and has tasked another PRRA officer with reassessing Changxing's application.

Changxing has been in Canada since 1999, and has so far stymied China's attempts to repatriate him. His refugee claim was denied some time ago, and it appears his remaining avenues to remain in Canada rest with the PRRA -- an extremely limited remedy, with a success rate (here in the Prairie region anyway) of less than 5%.

It will likely take another year for another assessment. It remains to be seen whether CIC will be able to 'judgment proof' another negative decision from the ever-resourceful Matas. If there's a possibility for Changxing to remain in Canada, Matas will find it.

Matas is essentially a one-man operation out of Winnipeg. I remember him from my days as a Refugee Protection Officer. A small man with a quick mind, he had the respect of the officer's and the Board -- he has contributed greatly to his profession. 

Canada's immigration and security weaknesses

I remember the first time I realized the weaknesses inherent in Canada’s immigration and refugee system. It occurred during my very first month as a Refugee Protection Officer, when I was screening a refugee claim referred to the Immigration and Refugee Board by Citizenship and Immigration Canada.

Essentially, when a person claims for refugee protection either within Canada at an in-land CIC office (like the airport, or the CIC office at the Harry Hays building here in Calgary) or at the border, CIC has the responsibility to ensure that the individual is ‘eligible’ to make a refugee claim.

Unfortunately, the eligibility determination relies mainly on information provided by the refugee claimant himself. At the same time, CIC does not have the ability to magically divine the true nature or background of the individual before them. A large number of refugee claimants come from countries such as Pakistan, where fraudulent documents (including passports and therefore new identities) are easily obtained.

Once CIC determine the person is eligible to make a refugee claim, the file is transferred to the Immigration and Refugee Board, where the file is screened and (eventually) a hearing is set down and the claim is heard by an independent decision maker (appointed generally without explicit legal/refugee experience – but is generally an individual who has connections to the federal party currently in power in Ottawa). At that time the refugee claimant is either granted refugee status, or is denied.

Before me that day was an individual who explicitly stated that he was a ‘leader’ of a known illegal and terrorist group in Pakistan well known to violate the human rights of religious minorities in that country. Notwithstanding his acknowledgement, the file was proceeding in the ‘refugee stream’ and it would be likely years before he could be removed from Canada.

Luckily, there were provisions in the Immigration and Refugee Board that allowed CIC to ‘claw back’ the file and set the matter down instead for an admissibility hearing (allowing for a more expeditious removal of this individual).

After a sigh of relief, I had time for more reflection on the matter. The only reason that the individual was facing removal from Canada was because he was foolish enough to acknowledge his relationship with the illicit organization. I wondered how many more similar individuals – perhaps more cunning, or perhaps more reticent – were able to utilize the refugee determination system to obtain status in Canada.

But, it goes beyond our refugee determination system. There are holes throughout the system. Background checks of prospective immigrants are essentially an exercise in futility. The Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) is apparently charged with playing “a leading role in protecting the national security interests of Canada”. CSIS itself has acknowledged in 2006 that 90% of immigration applications from Pakistan and Afghanistan -- ‘hotbeds for Islamic fundamentalism’ -- have not been adequately screened for security concerns.

Citing a lack of resources, Jack Hooper, deputy director of operations for CSIS told a Senate national security committee last year, that the ‘Service’ (as it refers to itself) was not in a position to vet one-tenth [of the 20,000 immigrants from Afghanistan/Pakistan]. In a fantastic if not ludicrous understatement, he remarked “That may be inadequate”.

I think that we may as well stick our collective heads in the sand against the very real and imminent threat in our midst, hoping against reason that it will go away, if the number two man at CSIS thinks one-tenth may be inadequate.

What I propose may be shocking or revolutionary, but I suggest – in the name of the national and public interest -- that immigration applications should not be processed if adequate security screening has not been done. A lack of resources can never be an excuse in this post-9/11 world.