I doubt that any immigration practitioner would have imagined that Sukhvir Singh Khosa's IAD appeal would reach the Supreme Court of Canada. The 2004 decision was heard by a three member panel. It appears that Khosa's failure to show sufficient "insight" was a major issue for the majority decision:
23 Counsel for the appellant made lengthy submissions contending that it is
not the function of the Division to mete out further punishment to this
appellant for his offence. Counsel is entirely correct that it would be
inappropriate for the panel to take that role upon itself. The criminal justice
system has spoken with respect to the appellant's guilt and handed down a
sentence consistent with principles of sentencing in Canada. The role of the
Division is distinct and separate from the criminal courts. This is an
application for discretionary relief. Domestic immigration legislation provides
that a removal order may be made as against permanent residents who are
inadmissible on the grounds of serious criminality. When an appeal is taken from
a removal order, the Division must look at all the circumstances in any given
case, weigh the various factors both supportive and non-supportive of special
relief and reach a determination. Counsel for the appellant urges the panel to
conclude the appellant is not a danger to the Canadian public and, on that
basis, find in the appellant's favour. While noting the trial judge's
conclusions with respect to likelihood of re-offence and the absence of a prior
criminal record, the fact is that, given the failure of the appellant to
acknowledge his conduct and accept responsibility for his reckless behaviour,
particularly street-racing with another vehicle on a public roadway, there is
insufficient evidence upon which I can make a determination that the appellant
does not represent a present risk to the public. Even were I to do so, in
balancing all the relevant factors, I determine the scale does not tip in the
appellant's favour and decline to exercise favourable discretion in all the
circumstances of this case.
At the same time, the dissenting opinion, written by Sherry Wiebe, appears (to me at least) to be more compelling:
32 [6] The Appellant committed a reckless act with grievous consequences,
which cannot be undone. He was convicted of one crime. The Appellant is a young
man with no criminal history, or even a history of antisocial behaviour. There
is little if any risk to the public, I find. The Appellant remains under the
sanction of the courts for years to come and has complied with the conditions
imposed on him. He is, and has from the time of the tragedy, been remorseful. He
has suffered serious consequences for his actions, as he will continue to do for
the rest of his life. His family too has suffered.
...
42 [16] There is no evidence that the Appellant is a committed street racer.
To the contrary41 , the evidence led the B.C.C.A. to find that the Appellant's
actions are less serious than other street racing crimes. The race was found to
be spontaneous and of short duration.42 In particular, the Appellant's car was
travelling at speeds less than street racers often drive, and the car was not
modified.
43 [17] Taking these factors into account, including the conclusions of the
courts, I place significant mitigating weight on this having been a spontaneous,
unplanned race of short duration, as well as on the evidence the Appellant does
not fit the usual profile of street racers.
44 [18] I too find that the Appellant's complete absence of prior criminal
history is important in assessing the weight to attach to the seriousness of the
Appellant's criminality in the immigration context, and correspondingly
mitigates it.
45 [19] There is no evidence of an escalation in criminal activity. This is
the Appellant's only criminal conviction, a marked contrast to the history of
criminality often seen in these appeals. The Appellant's conduct prior to this
was considered exemplary. There is no evidence of criminal propensity or of a
pattern of criminal conduct.
46 [20] I find that the evidence in this appeal overwhelmingly supports that
the Appellant is hard-working and, with the exception of this conviction, is
also a law-abiding individual. The trial judge too found, and I accept, that the
Appellant and his co-accused are "hard working, law abiding persons and good
sons."
...
51 [25] I find that the Appellant is contrite and remorseful. The Appellant
at hearing was regretful, his voice tremulous and filled with emotion. His
appearance was that of a defeated man who was extremely sorrowful. Early on, he
apologized to the deceased's family through his counsel. In testimony, he
expressed his profound regret for the loss of life as a result of his unthinking
actions when he decided to drive fast on that fateful day. He apologized
directly to the family present, and I find his expression of regret for their
loss is sincere.
52 [26] I find that the evidence proves that the Appellant has been
devastated by these events, and that he is not likely to forget the trauma he
has experienced, or the loss suffered by the Thorpe family. I find the evidence
proves that the Appellant's actions in future will be governed by this
experience.
53 [27] The majority of this panel have placed great significance on the
Appellant's dispute that he was racing, when the criminal court found he was.
And while they concluded this was " not fatal" to his appeal, they also
determined that his continued denial that he was racing "reflects a lack of
insight." The panel concluded that this "is not to his credit." The panel found
that the Appellant was remorseful, but concluded it was not a "compelling
feature in light of the limited nature of the Appellant's admissions".
54 [28] However I find the Appellant's remorse, even in light of his denial
he was racing, is genuine and is evidence that the Appellant will in future be
more thoughtful and will avoid such recklessness.
55 [29] I find the evidence proves on balance that the Appellant comes from
a modest family with good values, and that overall he is responsible, and a good
son. He does not now drink alcohol or use any illicit substances.
...
74 [48] In summary, I am satisfied that the evidence proves that there would
be hardship from dislocation that would be experienced by the Appellant, his
wife and his immediate family, and that it would be significant. I find too that
there is evidence of establishment, including of a solid work history, that is
positive. I find that the Appellant has made his life in Canada. I find that the
relationship between immediate family members, including Manjeet Kaur's
relationship with her family in Canada, is close and significant. I find that
the banishment of an only son in a close family to a distant geographic location
would work a hardship in the circumstances of this case. There is no evidence of
the best interests of a child directly affected by the decision.
Conclusion
75 [49] In light of my finding that the weight of the basis for the removal
order is mitigated, and that there is minimal, if any, risk to the public, and
in that there is significant credible evidence of humanitarian considerations, I
find that compassion is called for and hence, in this case, special relief is
warranted.