Canada brings deported gangster back "home"

Can't summarize better than the National Post:

Panchalingam Nagalingam, who was deported in 2005 because of his involvement in a violent Toronto street gang, arrived back on Tuesday morning, and Canadian officials say they facilitated and paid for his return. The circumstances have one official lamenting that the government is "in the business of putting gangs and gangsters out of business, not in bringing them back to Canada."

This 2007 Toronto Star article discusses Mr. Nagalingam's case and the original (successful) Federal Court decision that had allowed Mr. Nagalingam's application (it was that decision that was recently set aside by the Federal Court of Appeal).

It appears that Mr. Nagalingam was returned because of a successful judicial review application:

The Ministry of Justice agreed in December, 2005, that it would allow Mr. Nagalingam to return to Toronto if the courts ever overturned a decision that found he was a danger to the public, officials said. The Federal Court of Appeal did just that in April, 2008, ruling that the judge who decided Mr. Nagalingam's case had made a procedural mistake.

The Federal Court of Appeal decision can be found here:

[78]           In this case, the Delegate found that the A.K. Kannan was a criminal organization generally involved in severe criminal acts, and that the appellant was an active member in that group. This is not sufficient to meet the threshold of paragraph 115(2)(b) of the Act. On this point, I note that the specific rank of the appellant within the A.K. Kannan criminal organization is unclear.  In the Request for Minister’s Opinion, supra, the appellant is said to be a “leader” by a source “confirmed [to be] reliable” (at paragraph 24), whereas in the Delegate’s Opinion, he is referred to as an “enforcer” on the basis of a witness’ statement who later disowned his prior declaration to that effect.
 
[79]           While this general approach used by the Delegate would be consistent with a determination under paragraph 37(1)(a) of the Act, it falls short of meeting the personalized fact-driven inquiry dictated by paragraph 115(2)(b) of the same Act. Ultimately, not having to make an express finding of complicity does not mean that the Delegate was not required to conclude, on reasonable grounds, that the evidence pointed to the appellant as being complicit in the acts of organized criminality committed by the organization, acts that were of such nature and severity as to warrant his removal. The Delegate failed to do so.

Somehow, I think that Mr. Nagalingam will face another danger opinion (I'm now aware of any "double jeopardy" criminal concept applying stopping the government from doing so) in short order, and with the assistance of his able counsel (Ms. Barbara Jackman) will again make the rounds before the Federal Court.