The 30 Year War

Vic Satzewich’s 2021 article, "Lawyers, Immigration Consultants and the 33-Year Jurisdictional War," published in the Canadian Review of Sociology (Vol. 58, pp. 186-206), focused on his observations of the 33-year jurisdictional conflict between lawyers and immigration consultants in Canada. 

• Overview of the Conflict:
  • Satzewich examines a 33-year jurisdictional dispute (starting in the 1980s) between immigration lawyers and consultants over the right to practice immigration law in Canada, framing it as a struggle for professional control.
  • He uses an ecological framework (drawing on Andrew Abbott and Sida Liu) to analyze why lawyers, a powerful profession, failed to monopolize this field against consultants, a "weaker profession in the making."
• Origins and Context:
  • Consultants entered the immigration law field in the 1980s, driven by rising demand for affordable advice amid increasing complexity in Canada’s immigration system (e.g., federal/provincial streams).
  • Lawyers historically dominated this space, sanctioned by the state with high social status, but consultants gained traction, often at lower cost, prompting a defensive response from the legal profession.
• Key Jurisdictional Events:
  • Mangat Decision (2001): The Supreme Court ruled in Law Society of British Columbia v. Mangat that federal law (under the Paramountcy Doctrine) allowed non-lawyers to practice immigration law, rejecting the Law Society’s bid for a "full and final settlement" to exclude consultants. This forced a shared jurisdiction.
  • 2017 CIMM Hearings: The Standing Committee on Citizenship and Immigration reviewed consultant regulation, revealing ongoing tensions. The Canadian Bar Association (CBA) sought to bar consultants, but the state opted for a "boundary blurring" outcome with the 2019 College of Immigration and Citizenship Consultants Act.
• Lawyers’ Lack of Unified Voice:
  • Satzewich notes the legal profession didn’t speak as one. The CBA’s Immigration Law Section pursued "boundary making" to eradicate consultants, aiming for monopolistic closure.
  • Other lawyers, termed "consultant-friendly" (e.g., Lorne Waldman, Richard Kurland, myself), advocated "boundary blurring," accepting consultants’ role with enhanced regulation—e.g., tiered licensing or supervised practice.
  • At the 2017 hearings, nine lawyers testified with divergent views: CBA’s Ravi Jain pushed exclusion or subordination; Others, including myself argued for coexistence, citing access to justice and competent consultants (e.g., ex-officers).
• Reasons for Failure to Monopolize:
  • Internal Ecology: Lawyers’ profession is not homogenous—status, client base, and practice settings vary. High-status lawyers felt less threatened, per Satzewich, while others clung to exclusion, fracturing consensus.
  • State Response: The government rejected the CBA’s maximalist stance, favoring a compromise (the College) over a lawyer-only model, influenced by Mangat’s precedent and access-to-justice concerns. Third time the charm hopefully.
  • Consultant Growth: By 2017, over 5,000 Regulated Canadian Immigration Consultants (RCICs) operated, a multimillion-dollar industry too entrenched to dismantle without legislative upheaval.
• Theoretical Framing:
  • Satzewich blends Abbott’s settlement types (e.g., "division of labour" from Mangat) with Liu’s boundary work (CBA’s "making" vs. friendly lawyers’ "blurring"), showing how intra-professional splits shaped outcomes.
  • He suggests segments within the same profession can pursue opposing strategies, complicating resolution.
• The Complicated, Intractable Problem:
  • Immigration law’s complexity demands expertise, but consultants’ lower entry bar risks public harm—yet their affordability fills a gap lawyers can’t always bridge.
  • Ghost consultants (unregulated) exacerbate issues, untouchable by ICCRC or the College, requiring CBSA/RCMP action outside professional jurisdiction.
  • Satzewich implies the problem persists because legislative change to preclude non-lawyers—reversing Mangat and empowering lawyers exclusively—hasn’t occurred and faces hurdles: cost, access, and potential court challenges.
• State Ecology and Legislative Stasis:
  • The state’s complex ecology—courts, IRCC, Cabinet—splits authority. Mangat tied legislators’ hands; the 2017 hearings led to the College, not exclusion, possibly to avoid legal battles or system disruption.
  • Without amending IRPA to bar non-lawyers (as the CBA wanted), Satzewich sees no "full and final" resolution—consultants remain, regulated but not eliminated.
• Observations on Outcomes:
  • The CBA "lost" its war to oust consultants, per Satzewich, but consultant-friendly lawyers’ compromise "won" with the College—a "blurry settlement" allowing shared practice.
  • He questions why some lawyers support consultants (e.g., collaboration, teaching roles), suggesting status and context drive views, though data on lower-status lawyers is lacking.
• Conclusion:
  • Satzewich portrays a 33-year saga where lawyers’ disunity and state pragmatism stalled monopolistic closure. The problem’s complexity—balancing competence, access, and enforcement—remains intractable unless legislation shifts, which, by 2025, it hadn’t.
    

The resulting CIMM Report has resulted in changes to consultant governance, regulation and education but these tensions will undoubtedly remain.